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Abstract: Critical infrastructures support everyday activities in modern societies, facilitating the
exchange of services and quantities of various nature. Their functioning is the result of the integration
of diverse technologies, systems and organizations into a complex network of interconnections. Benefits
from networking are accompanied by new threats and risks. In particular, because of the increased
interdependency, disturbances and failures may propagate and render unstable the whole infrastructure
network. This paper presents a methodology of resilience analysis of networked systems of systems.
Resilience generalizes the concept of stability of a system around a state of equilibrium, with respect
to a disturbance and its ability of preventing, resisting and recovery. The methodology provides a tool
for the analysis of off-equilibrium conditions that may occur in a single system and propagate through
the network of dependencies. The analysis is conducted in two stages. The first stage of the analysis
is qualitative. It identifies the resilience scenarios, i.e. the sequence of events, triggered by an initial
disturbance, which include failures and the system response. The second stage is quantitative. The
most critical scenarios can be simulated, for the desired parameter settings, in order to check if they
are successfully handled, i.e recovered to nominal conditions, or they end into the network failure.
The proposed methodology aims at providing an effective support to resilience-informed design.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Networks and modern infrastructures can be considered as special instances of systems of systems (SoS)
[1]. A number of distinctive features characterize this class of systems. A list of these is provided in [2]:
1) operational and managerial independence, 2) geographical distribution, 3) emergent behavior and
4) evolutionary development. A fifth feature has to be added, especially in the case of networks and
infrastructures; the interoperability, which establish interdependencies among the diverse components.
These features makes SoS to escape from an easy classification into any of the existing engineering
and theoretical frameworks, and require a solid interdisciplinary mindset. The crucial issue, to which
many studies converge, is how to understand and govern risks and vulnerabilities in interdependent
infrastructures [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. This is not a trivial issue and actually many of the existing approaches
fail to return a solution. If one considers the risk assessment framework, for which the exact knowledge
on system is prerequisite, the postulated emergent behavior and evolutionary development of the SoS
would represent an hurdle for its application. Another hurdle is the specialization of the technology
sectors that usually do not share a common analysis framework. Several contributions exist in this
respect, see for example [9] and [10]. In the latter work, system interdependencies are modeled
and simulated within the distributed environment High Level Architecture, which is based on the
federation of diverse simulation platforms [11]. This modeling and simulation environment overcomes
the technical diversity among systems, thus reproducing separately processes and quantities by means
of the most suitable analysis tool. Nonetheless, with the exception of power grids and communication
networks, this methodology cannot be easily scaled up or generalized. A significant rethinking out of
the box is necessary, which concerns scope, objectives and the quantities to analyze [12, 13, 14].
In a framework for the modeling and analysis of SoS, interdependencies among components must be
within the scope. These are the preconditions for a SoS to operate, as well as they contribute to
the propagation of disturbances and failures [15]. Systems have a partial view of (inter)dependencies,
which is often limited to the components in the closest neighborhoods, those ones through which they
establish a direct relationship. The more the knowledge on (inter)dependencies is incomplete, the
more a system will become vulnerable from input disturbances. In its turn, and for similar reason,
a failure in the same system may jeopardize the network. In resilience engineering this uncertainty
on the system behavior is called system variability [3]. A consequence of system variability is that
the boundary between system behavior and misbehavior is blurry. For instance, the response of a
SoS may unpredictably evolve into diverse scenarios, and one of these could even be a dysfunctional
failure that, instead of a fault, will be caused by a legitimate control action by one of its components.
The problem, as it is formulated above, lays more in the domain of control rather than in the risk
assessment. In this theoretical framework, the variability is the quantity to be controlled and the
resilience is the system attribute that measures the success of this control action [3].
This paper presents a methodology for the resilience analysis of systems of systems. The scope of the
methodology covers structural and dynamic (inter)dependencies that are established among systems
via relationships of diverse nature, e.g. producer/consumer, provider/user, controller/controlled. The
objectives are 1) to derive the dependency network 2) to model failure propagation through the
dependency network, 3) to account for system variability within a resilience control paradigm (i.e.
perturbation, leave from the nominal state and return to it after a transient) 4) to provide support to
a resilience informed design for systems of systems and infrastructures. The methodology consists of
two analysis tools, one for the structural analysis of criticalities and vulnerabilities, and one for the
resilience analysis, both qualitative or quantitative. These tools make part of a modeling and analysis
framework, which also includes an ad-hoc modeling language, presented in previous works [16, 17].
The paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the structural analysis of the dependency
network. Section 3 presents the tools for the resilience analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS
A system of systems is a collection of heterogeneous components that interact and cooperate by re-
lationships of various nature, e.g. producer/consumer, provider/user, controller/controlled and so
forth. In order to master complexity, the representation of the SoS requires some restriction in scope
as well as adequate modeling abstraction. The idea is to limit the scope to the components’ inter-
face. Moreover, the relationships established at the interface are modeled as functional dependencies,
dimension-free, so that the components involved in a dependency do not necessarily have to share the
same domain of representation. The following definitions hold:
Dependency network: a dependency network of a SoS results from the transformation of relation-
ships into functional dependencies. It is a directed graph G(N,A), with a set of nodes (N) and
arcs (A).
Dependency: a functional dependency is a relationship between two nodes, either direct or indirect
(i.e. mediated by other nodes).
An example of system of systems is shown in Figure 1. This example is an oversimplified representation
of interoperability among three diverse infrastructures (gas, power grid and communication), and
will serve as a proof of concepts along the paper. The model, depicted in the figure, is obtained
with the Infrastructure Resilience-Oriented Modeling Language or IRML, see [16]. Five systems are
represented: the gas network, the power plant, the transmission and the distribution systems, and the
communication system. These systems exchange services and/or quantities among them. For example,
the gas network supplies the power plant, which in its turn produces the electricity for the transmission
Figure 1: From the SoS to the dependency network.
system. The distribution system receives the electricity from the transmission and distributes it
to the communication system. These are inter-system relationships, though there also intra-system
relationships which are established among the different domains and resources that constitute a system.
For example, control and supervision domains establish a control relationship over the transmission
network. The reservoir in the power plant system is a resource for the power generation. Again,
the monitoring in the distribution system supervises the load and transmits this information, via the
communication data link, to the control system. In the real world, other dependencies are possible,
but they are here ignored on purpose, for the sake of illustration.
The transformation of the IRML model into a dependency network is not strictly isomorphic, see
also [17] for more details. Depending on the desired level of description, it is possible to give more
emphasis to certain relationships and simplify others. In this example, we emphasize the dependencies
on electricity consumption, the supply chain, and the control relationship established through the
communication system. The result is shown in the dependency network of Figure 1(b). The six nodes
represent the gas network (1), the power plant (2), the control and supervision (3), the transmission (4),
the distribution (5) and the communication (6). Seven arcs account for the functional dependencies.
Input arcs express the dependency of a node with respect to its ancestors, while output arcs express
the dependencies of the descendant nodes with respect to the ancestor node. Forks and junctions are
encountered in the dependency network, as well as loops. A fork means that more nodes will depend
on the ancestor, for example nodes 3 (control) and 4 (transmission) depend on node 2 (power plant).
A junction means that the node will depend on more ancestor nodes, which is the case of node 3 and
4. Loops will be examined in the following section.
Figure 2: Criticality and vulnerability sets of node 2.
2.1. Analysis of the dependency network
The analysis of a dependency network returns the structural properties of specific node with respect to
the other nodes, such as its criticality, vulnerability and the interdependency. But it may also provide
aggregated metrics, such as the interaction and coupling coefficients of the network [6]. The following
definitions hold:
Criticality: A node k is critical with respect to nodes that depend on it. These nodes belong to the
criticality set of node k, C(k).
Vulnerability: A node k is vulnerable with respect to the nodes on which it depends. These nodes
belong to the vulnerability set of node k, V (k).
Figure 2 shows the criticality and vulnerability sets of node 2 (power plant). This node has a larger
criticality set [3, 4, 5, 6], though it is vulnerable (and depends on) only from node 1, the gas network.
In the given model, this means that in case of failure of the power plant all nodes that transport,
distribute, control and consume electricity will be affected, either directly or indirectly.
Two nodes that depend on each other are said to be interdependent. In literature, several definitions
of interdependencies exist, and not only of functional nature, see for example [18]. The majority of
interdependencies are indirect, that is they are mediated by other nodes. These interdependencies can
be identified in the dependency network as it follows:
Interdependency: In the dependency network, two nodes are indirectly interdependent if they be-
long to a loop.
As a consequence of interdependency, the criticality and the vulnerability sets of a node are not
disjoint. This implies that every node of the loop is both critical to and vulnerable from the other
nodes in the loop. Figure 3 shows the criticality and vulnerability sets for node 3 (control), which
belongs to the loop [3, 4, 5, 6]. The criticality and vulnerability sets of node 3 are not disjoint, as
it was the case of node 2 in Figure 2. For instance, control and supervision (3) are both critical and
vulnerable to communication, though the criticality is not by direct dependency, but mediated by the
transmission and distribution systems.
Other metrics can be derived from the analysis of the dependency network. In particular, two metrics
stand out: network interaction and coupling [6]. The network interaction is related to the network
complexity and interdependencies. The presence of loops is the main factor that influences interactions
among nodes. Accordingly, the higher the number of loops, the higher the interaction coefficient.
Network coupling is proportional to the depth of the criticality set of a node, combined with its out-
degree. The lower the depth, the lesser steps are necessary to recover the system when things go
Figure 3: Criticality and vulnerability sets of node 3
wrong. Conversely, a larger node out-degree implies that the consequences of undesirable behavior
from node k will influence more paths at a time.
These metrics are adapted from Perrow’s theory for the analysis of complex systems [6]. According
to these metrics, the worst situation would be that of a dependency network with many loops, i.e.
strong interaction, and nodes with a low depth of the respective criticality sets and large out-degree.
In contrast, a desirable situation would be described by a network with few loops and nodes with
high depth and small out-degree. Given a dependency network, by the analysis of its graph, it will
be possible to plot interaction vs. the coupling coefficient. Different graphs will lead to different
classifications in this two dimension space, thus making it possible a comparison of their structural
properties. For design purposes, given that a particular dependency network is analyzed with regard
to Perrow’s dimensions, and assuming that the network functionality is preserved, it is possible to say
that the reduction of the interaction and coupling may contribute to improve the overall resilience.
3. RESILIENCE ANALYSIS
3.1. Assumptions and definitions
The criticality set of a node returns the maximum extension of a disturbance propagation in the
dependency network, which is the worst scenario. More realistically, the network is expected to have
measures in place to resist, stop propagation and recover to the initial state in a resilient fashion.
The following assumptions govern the disturbance/failure propagation and the recovery dynamics
throughout the network:
• A1: A disturbance affects one particular node and, from that node, it propagates to its closest
descendants in the criticality set;
• A2: each node may fail (after a time to failure TF ), if it is affected by disturbance from at least
one of the ancestor nodes;
• A3: each node may recover (after a time to recover TR) if all ancestor nodes have recovered.
As a consequence of disturbance propagation, the nodes in the dependency graph change their state,
from an assumed initial state. The recovery to this initial state, after a transient period, will attest
that the network is resilient with respect to the given disturbance. The following definitions hold:
Network state: The state of the network is the set of the node’s output states. The node output
state is a binary variable that takes two values: up (1) if the node is functioning and down (0)
if it has failed.
Disturbance and failure: a disturbance is the event that challenges a node to leave the up state to
the down state. The failure is the transition of the node state from up to down.
The node change of state from 0 to 1 is due to performance degradation below a certain threshold,
e.g. a minimum service level. This degradation process can be modeled internally to each node.
Every node is given two resilience measures: 1) resist to a disturbance and 2) recover from a failure.
Buffering and/or spare components are examples of resistance measures in technical systems. These
measures can withstand a disturbance for a given time interval before the node fails, i.e. the time
to failure TF . Recovery measures restore the node state to up, after a given time interval, i.e. the
time to recovery TR. Disturbance duration, time to failure and time to recovery are the parameters
for the quantitative resilience analysis. These quantities are often available at service operators, and
public utilities. For example, the power plant has got a reservoir to withstand the disruption in the
gas supply chain, which can be estimated into several days, i.e. the TF . It is important to remark
that the failure of the power plant itself, caused by internal reasons, is not related to this TF .
3.2. Resilience scenarios
A resilience scenario is the response of SoS to the failure propagation of a disturbance generated in
one node, and to which it can be associated a trajectory in the space of states of the dependency
network.
A resilience scenario may be either conditioned or unconditioned.
• Unconditioned scenario: a resilience scenario is unconditioned if, whatever the duration of
the disturbance, when this stops, it is possible to recover back to the initial network state.
• Conditioned scenario: a resilience scenario is conditioned if the recovery back to the nominal
network state is conditioned either by the duration of the disturbance or by structural properties.
The conditioned scenarios further specialize into deadlock scenarios and time-bounded scenarios.
• Deadlock scenario: a deadlock scenario occurs when all nodes in a loop have failed.
• Time bounded scenario: a time bounded scenario occurs when at least a deadline for recovery
of a node exists, at the expiration of which that node(s) cannot be recovered anymore.
A deadlock cannot be removed once it is established in the loop, even though the initial disturbance
stops. The removal of a deadlock would ask for additional resources (e.g. emergency management),
which are out-of-the-loop, and not included in the dependency network. Deadlocks may be found
in systems that produce a good and use a service which depends on the consumption of that good,
directly or indirectly. In the given example, the communication depends on the electricity distribution,
which depends on the transmission that is operated by the control system. This latter receives data
from the communication, which trivially closes the loop.
A time bounded scenario occurs if the network is not recovered back to its initial state, by a given time
interval. Time-bounded scenarios can be found in those systems that include parts that deteriorate
or provide services that are non-interruptible. In the example, a rail freight transportation system
that depends on the distribution and communication systems could be added. The fact that goods
deteriorate if not delivered before a certain interval would make the scenario to be time-bounded.
In theory, a third type of resilience scenario exists. Failure and recovery events may run one after the
other without ending up neither into a deadlock nor into the initial network state. This scenario is
only possible with loops and a particular parameter settings. The resulting state trajectory will be
unstable without leading to a network failure, i.e. a deadlock. Again, only an external intervention
may prevent the network to fall into these scenarios.
3.3. Qualitative resilience analysis
The goal of the qualitative analysis is the generation of the resilience scenarios starting from an initial
disturbance. This analysis is conceptually similar to model checking. Model parameters (disturbance
duration, TF and TR) do not need to be defined, being the analysis qualitative. The causes of the
disturbance, and its nature, are also out of scope.
The generation of resilience scenarios starts from the node affected first by disturbance and continues
by visiting the nodes in its criticality set. This process is similar to the building of an event sequence
diagram in risk analysis, though it is conceptually different. The main difference is that events are
here concurrent instead of being mutually exclusive, like success and failure are. Moreover, one branch
for every concurring event has to be generated. In order to account for concurrency, each block of the
diagram is labeled with two sets F and R that account respectively for the set of active failure events
and the set of active recovery events. For an event to be in F or R means that the respective node is
in the process of failing or recovering. The occurred failures and recovery events are associated to the
transition arcs.
The concurrent event sequence diagram starts with the disturbance in the node k, which is the initiat-
ing event. As long as the disturbance persists, only failure events are active events (assumption A3).
When the disturbance stops, recovery events are also enabled. The next event is selected from the
list of the active concurrent events. In the case of a failure event: 1) the event is removed from F, 2)
a new block is generated and 3) new failure events are added in F, which account for the descendant
nodes affected by disturbance propagation. In a similar way, in the case of a recovery event, 1) this
is removed from R, 2) a new block is generated and 3) new recovery events are added in R, which
account for the descendant nodes that are enabled to recover. The sequence terminates if R and F
are empty, and it is labeled as resilience scenario.
An example of resilience scenario generation is shown in Figure 4. The graphic convention states that
the diagram develops downwards, if a failure occurs, and rightwards into a new column if a recovery
occurs. The sequence is assumed to start with the failure of node 2 (power plant), i.e. the initiating
event, which triggers disturbances at the same time in node 3 (control) and 4 (transmission). The
failure propagates up to node 5 (distribution) before the disturbance from node 2 stops. After this
event, node 3 recovers and enables the recovery of node 4 too. The sequence of events continues with
the failure of node 6 (communication) and 3 (control) followed by the recovery of 5 (distribution), up
to the point in which failure in 4 (transmission) and recovery in 6 (communication) are concurrent
active events. From there on, the diagram takes two different directions. The early recovery of the
communication network will result into a recovered scenario, while the early failure of the transmission
will lead to a deadlock. This result is not necessarily the actual network behavior, but just a possible
scenario. Still, it provides a punctual information on the sequence of events that may lead to the
deadlock. This information should be dealt with care. The existence of diverse scenarios for a given
disturbance is a consequence of the system variability. The quantitative analyses will make it possible
to simulate the identified scenarios and check whether the network will end into a deadlock or it will
recover, in a resilient fashion.
In the given example, only two scenarios are shown, for sake of illustration, but many more could
have been generated. Many blocks in Figure 4 have more active events (in F and R), from which
diverse sequences could have departed. The outcome of the qualitative resilience is to identify all those
sequences that lead to a deadlock, and this analysis should be done at least for the most critical nodes
in the dependency network.
A significant reduction of scenarios is possible if heuristics are applied to cut branches and/or terminate
a sequence. The number of nodes involved and the depth of propagation are two possible heuristics,
related to the likelihood of an event sequence. For example, a long event sequence may be deemed
to be unlikely if the events are independent. It is also possible to associate consequences to an event
sequence, and this is another heuristic. If the estimated consequence are already non acceptable, from
a certain event onwards, there will be no need to develop the scenario further.
Figure 4: Two possible resilience scenarios: deadlock and recovered.
3.4. Quantitative resilience analysis
A resilience scenario can be associated to one or more trajectories in the network state space, depending
on the parameters TF and TR. A quantitative resilience analysis makes it possible to simulate this
scenario, for the desired model parameter settings, and check whether it will end up into a recovered
scenario, into a deadlock or into an unstable scenario. Given that for a dependency network the only
acceptable state is the one for which all nodes are in the up state, the following definition of network
resilience holds:
Network resilience: the network resilience is defined as the sum of all node’s output states.
This definitions also applies to subsets of the network, like loops. Figure 5 shows the resilience of the
loop [3, 4, 5, 6] versus time, i.e. r = x3+x4+x5+x6, for the deadlock and recovered scenarios identified
in Figure 4. The analysis of the deadlock scenario is obtained with a default parameter setting for TF
and TR, equal to 1 for every node. The disturbance (a step function) occurs at t = 5, and last 2.5
time unit. Time units and the value of parameters do not refer to any real problem set up. The loop
resilience shows an an irregular trend, during which the systems attempt the recovery but then they
all fail, the loop resilience becomes zero and the loop enters the deadlock. The recovered scenario is
obtained by halving the time to recovery of the node communication (6). Due to this modification,
the recovery of communication is faster than the failure of the transmission, thus enabling earlier the
recovery of control. In this scenario, the loop resilience moves back to its initial value (r = 4) after
a transient of about 2.4 time units, and the deadlock is avoided. Details on the mathematics for the
simulation are out of scope and they are omitted.
Qualitative and quantitative analysis are complementary tools, though the latter, by simulation of
scenarios, makes it possible to obtain more insights for the resilience assessment. The scope is also
larger. For instance, it is possible to model disturbances that affect the same node at periodic intervals,
as well as multiple sources of disturbance that affect different nodes. The latter situation can be
considered as an attack pattern, and it extends the scope of the analysis to security issues. In general,
model parameters could be given probabilistic distributions. In this case, a Monte Carlo simulation
will be the right tool.
Figure 5: Simulation of resilience scenarios within the loop [3, 4, 5, 6].
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a methodology for the resilience analysis of networked systems of systems.
The scope of the methodology covers structural and dynamic dependencies that establish among
components, and are here represented by a dependency network. The analysis is both structural and
dynamic. Structural analysis identifies criticalities and vulnerabilities in the dependency network.
Dynamic analysis copes with the propagation of a disturbance, generated in one node, throughout the
network. Resilience is analyzed in a qualitative way by identifying all sequences of events, caused by
an initial disturbance, which end up into scenarios, either recoverable or non recoverable, i.e. deadlock.
A quantitative analysis simulates these scenarios and evaluates the ability of the network to resist and
recover in a resilient fashion. An example of interconnected, cooperating infrastructures was used as
case study and proof of concepts along the paper.
The methodology introduces several original ideas that are here summarized. Relationships among SoS
components are represented by a network of functional dependencies. The response to a disturbance is
accommodated into a concurrent event sequence diagram. The definition of resilience takes inspiration
from the concepts of stability and robustness in control system theory. Resilience analysis is conducted
on a compact set of parameters that includes the disturbance duration, the times to failure and times
to recovery of each model component. Finally, the analysis returns recommendations, which may be
used by an operator or a decision maker, and integrated within a resilience informed design.
The analysis tools and the modeling language IRML are a stand-alone modeling framework, though
they may also be applied together with risk assessment, should it be necessary to estimate the risk of
a given scenario. Another application of the methodology, not presented in this paper, is in support to
accident analysis, for discovering those vulnerabilities caused by (inter)dependencies. The modeling
language IRML and the analysis tools will be implemented as software1.
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